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Abstract—Mobile operators offer a wide range of value-
added services (VAS) to their subscribers (i.e., mobile users),
which in turn generates around 15% of the telecommunication
industry revenue. However, simultaneous VAS requests from a
large number of mobile devices to a single server or a cluster
in an internet-of-things (IoT) environment could result in an
inefficient system, if these requests are handled one at a time
as the present traditional cellular network scenario is. This will
not only slow down the server’s efficiency but also adversely
impacts the performance of the network. The current (insecure)
practice of transmitting user identity in plaintext also results in
traceability. In this paper, we introduce the first known protocol
designed to efficiently handle multiple VAS requests at one time,
as well as ensuring the secure delivery of the services to a large
number of requesting mobile users. The proposed batch verifica-
tion protocol (BAS-VAS) is capable of authenticating multiple
simultaneous requests received by a large number of mobile
users. We demonstrate that the protocol preserves user privacy
over the network. The provider’s servers ensure the privacy
of the requested service’s priority by performing sorting over
encrypted integer data. The simulation results also demonstrate
that the proposed protocol is lightweight and efficient in terms of
communication and computation overheads, protocol execution
time, and batch and re-batch verification delay. Specifically, we
perform batch and re-batch verification (after detecting and
removing malicious requests from the batch) for multiple requests
in order to improve the overall efficiency of the system, as well as
discussing time, space and cost complexity analysis, along with
the security proof of our protocol using Proverif.
Index Terms—Authentication, Batch Verification, Mobile User,
Privacy Preservation, Value Added Service.
I. INTRODUCTION
MOBILE computing and telecommunications industriesare among the ones of the fastest growing industries
worldwide. Mobile/cellular technologies, such as Long Term
Evolution (LTE), are useful in environments where mobile
users access Value-Added Services (VAS) through a Value-
Added Service Provider (VASP). VAS are services offered by
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telecommunication operators to their subscribers for enabling
direct, fast and easy access of information. As VAS are
generally delivered over mobile devices, such services are also
referred to as Mobile Value-Added Services (M-VAS). M-VAS
are reportedly accessed by 75% of mobile subscribers at India
in 2014 [1]. Popular VAS delivered via Short Message Service
(SMS) include music and entertainment links and codes (e.g.,
voting for reality shows and contests), booking of match and
movie tickets, location based services, mobile advertising,
SMS chatting and dating services, mobile banking through
SMS, sports news and current affairs, weather reports, promote
retail sales, festival related notifications, government reach to
its citizen through SMS, and retrieving of game scores) [2].
For the foreseeable future and in the world of Internet-of-
Things (IoT), M-VAS will have widespread applications. For
example, M-VAS reportedly account for approximately 15%
of telecommunication industry revenues [3]. The global M-
VAS market is expected to increase to $655.07 billion by
2020 [4], and M-VAS market size is set to exceed USD 1,300
billion by 2024 [5]. However, balancing between security
and efficiency in the service delivery to a large number of
mobile devices will be challenging. According to Lerner et
al. from Solon Telecoms, UK [6], among the VAS companies
they have spoken with, most show strong continued organic
growth in SMS-based revenues driven by growing penetration
and ability to drive engagement. The cloud-based consumer
VAS market revenue is estimated to be $48.4 billion in 2017
and is expected to reach $171.7 billion by 2023, growing at
a CAGR of 23.5% during the forecast period 2017-2023. The
SMS market revenue is estimated to reach $111.74 billion by
2023, growing at a CAGR of 21.5% during 2017-2023 [7].
Problem Statement: Operators of different cellular networks,
such as Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM),
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), and
LTE, generally transmit data on the same channel as voice
to optimize resource utilization, and non-voice data normally
takes the form of VAS through SMS [8]. However, in Jan.
2014, the Guardian newspaper and Channel 4 News reported
that the NSA collects (lawfully) and stores almost 200 million
text messages per day across the globe. NSA programmes code
named “Dishfire” and “Prefer” extracted location informa-
tion, contacts and financial data from SMS messages, including
automated texts, such as roaming charge alerts [9]. Vesselin
mentioned on Security Tokens [10] that people are aware that
SMS-based authentication is insecure because of security flaws
like Singling System 7 (SS7).
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ITU-T Q.3615, which is a telecommunication standardiza-
tion sector of International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
provides the communication of location information between
various Location-Based Services (LBSs) over SMS [11]. ITU-
T X Series provides standard and guidelines for data networks,
open system communications and security [12] (last updated
on 4 June 2019). But at present, telecom operators do not
implement any security services to SMS due to overhead and
cost. More specifically, ITU-T Rec. X.1146 identified the user
identity authentication as a threat to VAS on single user account
basis and does not discuss and support batch verification-based
user authentication for VAS. According to a 2016 study [13],
the usage of SMS for different services has many security
flaws. The researchers have analyzed 400,000 text messages
and found a significant portion of these messages was sent
with confidential and private information (like credit card
numbers, CVV, PIN, password reset options, etc.) that can
be accessed over the network, as the traditional SMS does
not contain any security, nor any authentication process for
broadcast/multicast services. Also, in some countries, mobile
operators may require a separate license for M-VAS [3]. Mobile
operators such as Vodafone and Airtel provide M-VAS to their
customers, based on user’s information and usage preference
[14], [15]. However, this may limit the design of suitable
security protocols as well as affecting the performance of
M-VAS delivery to a large number of mobile subscribers (in
an IoT environment) and hence, user’s quality of experience.
For example, in the attempt to cater to wide ranging user
information and usage preferences (e.g., handling multiple
M-VAS requests at any one time) could result in significant
overheads, lengthy execution and verification times, and a
bottleneck. The performance challenge is compounded when
invalid authentication requests are transmitted to the AS due to
half-open connections by flood-based Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks and other cyber-attacks.
Saxena et al. proposed an “EasySMS” protocol for end-to-
end secure transmission of SMS [16], but the protocol only
deals with one SMS at a time. The system’s performance
degrades due to large overhead as there is an increase in
the number of mobile users’ requests for authentication. The
EasySMS protocol generates 18, 36 (1 time 100% increase),
216 (11 times increase), and 2016 (111 times increase) bytes
as the computation overhead when the number of mobile
users’ requests are 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, this protocol produces 2152, 4456 (1.07 times in-
crease), 27496 (11.77 times increase), and 257896 (118.84
times increase) bytes as the communication overhead for the
same number of users’ authentication requests. Clearly, single
authentication-based EasySMS generates too much overhead
and has performance issue with a large number of mobile
users’ authentication requests. Thus, in this paper, we focus
on the computational effort required by the VASP, seeking to
minimize wherever practical. In a real-world deployment, the
communication bandwidth between a user and the VASP may
be limited (e.g., in rural areas with poor coverage). Therefore,
we need to ensure the size of communicated messages to
be as small as possible. In addition, services requested by a
user should be un-linkable to each other, in order to ensure
confidentiality of the user and VAS. The adversary may also
target a specific user, based on the user’s priorities for different
services requested. For example, a user particularly in a
sparsely populated area (e.g., a rural town) could be identified
or profiled due to the user’s priorities for requested services.
Therefore, it is important to hide the priority of the service
requested by each user from the Authentication Server (AS),
Service Providing Server (SPS) and adversary.
A. Existing Solutions
A number of solutions have been presented in the literature
that are designed to provide VAS in different networks, such as
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) [17], [18], [19], [20],
public-private key based vehicular communication system
[21], [22], privacy-preserving authentication and access control
protocol in VANET [23], and social networks [24]. However,
there is no known solution for batch-oriented VAS services
to mobile users in a mobile/cellular network. In addition,
while existing solutions generally are secure against Man-
in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, they do not provide integrity
protection to the messages (with the exception in [20]). Zhang
et al. [19] introduced a batch signature verification protocol
IBV, based on identity-based cryptography, that can verify
multiple received signatures at the same time. Zhang et al.
[20] proposed a novel message authentication protocol named
RAISE that adopts the k-anonymity property for preserving
user privacy. They further proposed a supplementary protocol
that can cooperatively work to probabilistically verify only
a small percentage of these message signatures based on
a device’s computing capacity. Further, Huang et al. [18]
introduced an anonymous batch authenticated and key agree-
ment (ABAKA) protocol, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), to authenticate multiple requests sent from different
vehicles and establish different session keys for different
vehicles at the same time. Furthermore, Chim et al. [21]
provided a software-based solution, SPECS, which uses bloom
filter and trusted authority for key management and is based
on pairing-based bilinear mapping. Horng et al. [22] found
that SPECS is vulnerable to impersonation attack and hence,
proposed an improved version named b-SPECS+.
We also remark that IBV in [19] does not deliver mutual
authentication and only partially defeats impersonation attacks.
While user privacy is ensured in ABAKA [18], RAISE [20] and
PAACP [23], the RAISE protocol generates a large overhead
and has a large storage requirement, as it maintains an ID-
key table. The PAACP protocol is based on asymmetric key
cryptosystem that also generates a large overhead. It provides
access control to vehicles in order to communicate with road
side equipment. Unlike PAACP, different VAS provided by
many mobile operators do not impose any access restrictions
to the users, as all VAS are publicly available to each mobile
subscriber. Hence, in such a setting, an access control protocol
is not required. Both SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22] proto-
cols are vulnerable to replay attacks. There are a small number
of wireless SMS-based protocols [25], [26], [27], but these
protocols neither consider VAS nor handle multiple requests.
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There are also a number of commercially available soft-
ware such as SMSzipper, TextSecure, moGile Secure SMS,
CryptoSMS that allow users to send secure SMS, but they
are not suitable for M-VAS, as these software need to be
regularly patched to avoid any disclosed vulnerabilities to
be exploited. For example, TextSecure has already decided
to remove the encryption function [28], and the subscribers
will have to tap connection data for encrypted SMS. In fact,
the developers want to get rid of the security feature due to
the performance degradation and secret key distribution issue.
Hence, we cannot completely build our trust on these apps,
as some of their features or the applications itself can shut
down at any time. Similarly, for example, CryptoSMS does
not support all types of mobile devices [29]. Therefore, it is
preferable to develop an authentication protocol (rather than a
software) that would provide a secure communication interface
between the service providers and the end users.
It is also important to follow the best practices on mobile
device security. AlDairi et al. [30], for example, demonstrated
several potential security and privacy attacks on mobile plat-
form, such as eavesdropping, denial-of-service, man-in-the-
middle, phishing, spoofing, data integrity, and identity theft.
In order to defeat such attacks and achieve better awareness
and security behavior understanding, Bitton et al. [31] intro-
duced an expert-based procedure for deriving mobile security
awareness models for different attack classes (each class is an
aggregation of social engineering attacks that exploit a similar
set of human vulnerabilities). Furthermore, Thompson et al.
[32] evaluated data from 629 home computer and mobile de-
vice users to improve understanding of security behavior, and
several factors particularly, the perceived vulnerability, self-
efficacy, response cost, descriptive norm and psychological
ownership were tested against both types of device users. Only
perceived severity was only found to play a role in mobile
device security behavior.
Generally, a single authentication (non-batch) refers to the
authentication between a single mobile user and an authen-
tication server at any one time. The server will not process
any request sent by other mobile user until the first user’s
verification is successfully processed. On the other hand, in
a batch authentication process, if malicious user requests are
present, the process will not successfully complete. This will
require the detection of invalid mobile user requests, remove
them from the existing batch, and thereafter perform the batch
authentication process again, such a process is also referred to
as re-batch authentication. Batch authentication slightly differs
from a group authentication. Generally, a group is (much)
smaller than a batch, and a group is created for a specific
purpose and a goal, in the sense that it has special properties,
and group members work together towards the defined goal.
On the other hand, a batch is simply an involvement and
participation of several users belonging to one or several
groups. There are no defined members for mobile users under a
batch. A mobile user from any specific group can participate
in a batch authentication at any time. In fact, a batch can
contain several groups and their associated members. As an
example, several mobile users with differing purposes (e.g.,
dating-related services, e-ticketing services, and so on) can
participate in this protocol (as long as the users interact with
the same cellular service provider’s authentication server) to
secure their transmitted messages.
Though cellular-enabled data centers are the future, at
present they have their own growing pains to overcome,
and traditional SMS-based cellular systems are underway to
implement this idea. As the prices of cellular data plans
throughout the world continue to drop, the comparative cost
of installing additional lines solely for the purpose of network
fail over becomes more and more difficult to justify [33].
The 4G LTE infrastructure already includes authenticated and
encrypted internal signaling, integrity protection, enterprise
end-point routers, devices with built-in firewall, and Virtual
Private Network (VPN) tunneling with encryption for over
the Internet connectivity. Data centers will be drawn to data
plans featuring support for non-Internet-facing private 4G LTE
carrier networks as their traffic will be segregated from the
Internet. In addition to the regular authentication of the mobile
users, the network has to authenticate users asking for a spe-
cific VAS. For this second part, verification requires efficient
handling of the requests of mobile users, as each user may opt
for several VAS and can request many times in a day. Hence,
authentication with a traditional process will be too much time
consuming and the generated overhead will be way more than
the authentication in a batch. Hence, we designed the BAS-
VAS protocol that can manage the overall generated overhead
and time efficiency of the verified requests.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no batch verification-
based protocol (multiple user requests verification simulta-
neously) in the literature, which provides M-VAS, although
there are many authentication protocols for GSM network [34],
[35], [36], UMTS network [37], [38], [39], and LTE network
[40], [41]. All these protocols are mainly used to achieve
authentication, and do not execute authentication requests in
a batch. Existing group authentication and key agreement
protocols for LTE network [42], [43] are also not designed to
provide M-VAS or based on SMS. Hence, such protocols are
excluded in the performance evaluation. Recently in 2015, a
solution was proposed to ensure mobile user privacy [44]. The
solution considers that new International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) must always be chosen by the home network
to prevent assigning a single IMSI to two different Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and suggests predefined
multiple IMSI for each USIM. However, this solution requires
a large storage, generates significant overhead for pseudo-
identities, and consumes significant bandwidth to transmit
various IMSI to each Mobile Subscriber (MS).
B. Our Contributions
In this paper (based on a preliminary idea published in [45]),
we propose and present an efficient and secure batch oriented
authentication and key agreement protocol, hereafter referred
to as BAS-VAS, for providing VAS to mobile users. The
protocol allows mobile users a fast and easy way of consuming
VAS, as the protocol is based on symmetric key cryptography
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and performs symmetric key encryption (with the exception of
sorting encrypted messages), which is 1,000 times faster than
asymmetric key encryption [46]. Moreover, the AS is capable
of authenticating multiple requests at a time, which improves
the overall efficiency of the system. The BAS-VAS enables
efficient execution of VAS request with a lower verification
delay. It also provides confidentiality and integrity to the
messages, and non-linkability to previously received VAS. We
regard the contributions of this work to be three-fold:
• Our proposed BAS-VAS provides mutual authentications
between each MS and the AS. The BAS-VAS maintains
confidentiality using Advance Encryption Standard with
Counter mode (AES-CTR) and integrity using Message
Authentication Code (MAC) function between both, MS
and AS. These security features were not available in the
earlier protocol [45].
• We propose and demonstrate the usefulness of keeping
the original identity of each MS secret during its trans-
mission over the network in mitigating IMSI capturing
and impersonation attacks. In this approach, we do not
need to generate multiple IMSI at the AS or send multiple
IMSI to the MS, unlike in [44]. Moreover, unlike the
protocol in [45], we use a standard AES-CTR to generate
a Temporary Identity (TID) and an original IMSI.
• As the proposed protocol hides the priority of the service
requested by each user from other users and servers, we
present a protocol to perform sorting over the encrypted
priorities of different services.
We then compare the performance of the proposed protocol
with that of five protocols, namely: ABAKA, SPECS, b-
SPECS+, IBV and RAISE. In a single/batch authentication, the
BAS-VAS protocol achieves a reduction of 14.29% and 10%
in transmission bandwidth from the device to the server, in
comparison to both ABAKA and RAISE, respectively. However,
transmission bandwidth of our protocol is only slightly larger
than IBV [19], but IBV does not deliver mutual authentication
and only partially defeats impersonation attack. Our protocol
also reduces the communication bandwidth consumption from
the server to the device by 60%, in comparison to ABAKA and
RAISE, while IBV does not transmit data from the server to
the device. In addition, our protocol uses less bandwidth than
SPECS and b-SPECS+ (35.23% and 69.42%, respectively).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 presents the system and threat models, and the assumptions.
Sections 3 and 4 present the proposed BAS-VAS protocol
and its security analysis, respectively. The formal proof using
Proverif is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 present
the findings from the performance evaluation and simulation,
respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes this work.
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we present the system model (Section 2.1),
threat model (Section 2.2), and system assumptions (Section
2.3).
Mobile Users (MS)
Authentication Server 
(AS)
Value Added Service 
Provider Server (SPS)
(1) Mobile users request 
for Value Added Services 
(VAS) at the same time 
(2) The AS and each MS
authenticates each other (3) The AS asks SPS
to provide VAS to all 
verified MS
(4) The SPS
provides VAS to 
all authenticated 
and verified MS
Fig. 1: Batch verification authentication requests for the VAS.
A. System Model
We consider a scenario for VAS where multiple MS send
authentication requests to a AS simultaneously (or in fixed
short time duration). The challenge is for the AS to verify
and authenticate the maximum number of MS it is capable
of handling efficiently – see Figure 1. Upon receiving the
requests, AS will verify and send information of authenticated
MS to the server responsible for the requested VAS. Thereafter,
the SPS provides the service to all legitimate MS. These
authentication requests may be single or multiple to a AS.
However, in practice, it is unlikely to have only a single request
at any one time. If the server is only capable of handling
one request at a time, then a queue is required to manage
all incoming requests. This will results in the additional task
(i.e., queue management, resulting in increased overheads,
execution time, and costs of authentication). To scale well,
the AS needs to be very efficient in handling a large number
of requests sent in a burst (very short period of time).
One way to more efficiently handle multiple authentication
requests simultaneously is to perform batch authentication for
all incoming requests, and identify and remove invalid request
(e.g., generated by an adversary) prior to performing a re-batch
authentication. While there are additional costs associated with
the re-batch authentication, it can significantly reduce the
overall authentication costs. We further extend our scenario in
such a way where each MS can send its request with a priority
ranging from 1 to 5 (1-least and 5-most important). This will
allow the SPS to provide the required service according to
the user’s need (e.g., user pays a premium to have the service
delivered faster). The notations used in the remainder of this
paper are presented in Table I.
B. Threat Model
In the ideal model, all mobile users compute the required
functions in a probabilistic polynomial time, since the trusted
AS is linked to all mobile users via a perfect private and
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TABLE I: Notations
Symbol Description Size
IMSI International mobile subscriber identity 128
TID Temporary identity 128
G Identity of service provider 128
SK Shared secret key between MS and AS 128
DK Delegation key generated from SK 128
MAC Message authentication code 64
T/Ti/T1 Timestamp 64
k Random number 128
S Token value generated by MS 128
Actcode Activation code of SK key 64
f1() HMACSHA256 is used to generate DK –
f2() AES-CTR is used to generate TID –
f3() HMACSHA1 is used to generate MAC –
⊕ bitwise XOR operation –
authenticated channel. All mobile users are also honest. In the
realistic model, we consider a mix of mobile users, namely:
honest majority, semi-honest majority and no-honest majority.
The honest majority means that honest MS (legitimate to
the network) and AS send correctly formed outputs to each
other (i.e., majority of the requests are legitimate), whereas
for semi-honest, no more than half the MS send incorrectly
formed outputs to the AS (i.e., at least half of the requests
are legitimate). In the no-honest MS (malicious MS to the
network) scenario, more than half the MS send incorrectly
formed outputs to the AS (i.e., at most half of the requests are
legitimate). Furthermore, malicious MS computes the required
function in a probabilistic polynomial time with some arbitrary
information. We do not consider these scenarios for the AS, as
malicious AS does not have the correct keys in its database.
Therefore, we consider only the trusted AS scenario, where
the AS always sends correct outputs to all MS. All messages
are sent from the MS to the AS (and vice versa) in time
via an authenticated channel under the ideal model, while an
adversary can choose to delay some, or all, messages under an
unauthenticated channel in the realistic model. We assume that
an authenticated channel provides end-to-end security to the
transmitted message, and hence, there is no need for additional
message encryption.
i) Adversary: Our threat model consists of a static (non-
adaptive) and an adaptive adversary. In the static adversary
threat model, the set of corrupted users are fixed. In the
adaptive model, the adversary can corrupt any (number of)
user(s) at will during run time. Furthermore, adversary can
choose any input/output for the corrupted users. We also
consider passive and active adversaries in the network.
ii) Security Attacks, and Integrity and Privacy Violations:
The authentication protocol must provide mutual authentica-
tion [36], [39], where each MS must authenticate the AS to
which it is requesting for a VAS and also the AS must verify the
MS. Unidirectional authentication may lead to eavesdropping,
redirection and impersonation attacks [39], [43]. Also, the half-
open connection requests can be vulnerable to flood-based
DoS attacks. In addition, the protocol needs to handle key
generation, transmission and its usage. Specifically, the session
key must not be sent over the network in plaintext. The original
identity of each MS must also be protected during its trans-
mission over the network. Such privacy preservation helps to
prevent the system against MITM attacks [39], [44]. If IMSI
is sent in cleartext, an adversary can target the system/user by
tracing the user. Software such as IMSI catcher can be used to
capture IMSI of a user over a weak or unencrypted network.
Furthermore, data confidentiality and message integrity should
be maintained in order to enhance the resilience of the system
against common attacks [39]. Also, an adversary must not
be able to link current session authentication information
(e.g., messages and keys) with previous sessions (i.e., non-
linkability), in addition to ensuring forward/backward secrecy.
C. System Assumptions
Traditional mobile system is generally implemented using
symmetric key cryptosystem; thus, we choose a symmetric key
cryptosystem with a lightweight protocol so that it is backward
compatible (i.e., can run on older mobile devices). However,
we can add new features and services using any cryptographic
primitives. We then use Paillier homomorphic encryption to
implement sorting over encrypted integer data, which is not
possible using symmetric homomorphic encryption in the
considered scenario. Specifically, we consider the following
system assumptions:
Assumption 1. each MS has a unique identity as IMSI[36].
Assumption 2. Authentication Center (AuC) is part of the
AS; hence, AS ⊂ Home Location Register (HLR). In LTE,
the HSS (Home Subscriber Server) is the concatenation of
the HLR and the AuC. The encryption at the Base Transceiver
Station (BTS) works in the same way as in a traditional mobile
network. The AuC sends a session key of a user to the BTS via
secure channel [35], [37]. The HLR and AuC store information
about a mobile subscriber. This information includes the IMSI,
phone number, private key, and current location of the mobile
user for packet and circuit switched operations.
Assumption 3. A secret key SK is stored in the AuC’s
database as well as on the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
of the MS at the time of manufacture, similar to a traditional
mobile network [35], [37].
Assumption 4. The AS is a legitimate server, which does not
disclose or send stored secret keys of one user to others with-
out authorization, similar to a traditional mobile network [41].
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL: BAS-VAS
In this section, we present the proposed novel lightweight,
efficient and secure batch-oriented protocol, BAS-VAS, for
delivering VAS in a secure and timely manner (see Figure
3). BAS-VAS provides batch-oriented mutual authentication
between the AS and all MS. The protocol also maintains
message integrity between each MS and the AS using MAC,
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SIM Cardi AS
Receive and store Actcode ActcodeC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
For each MS, generate Actcode and
label it to its SK key and store in the
database;
Fig. 2: User registration in the proposed protocol.
MSi AS
Choose ki ∈ Z∗p, generate Ti,
DKi,
Compute Xi = ki ⊕ IMSIi,
Si = (ki + DKi ⊕G) mod m,
TIDi = f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi
(1) : Ti, Xi, Si, TIDi, Actcodei,MAC1i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
Verifies MAC1i
?
= MAC1
′
i , If yes,
proceed.
Generates DKi,
IMSIi = f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi ;
Computes
P =
∑m
i=1(DKi ⊕ IMSIi), and
R =
∑m
i=1(Si⊕ IMSIi)− (G⊕P );
If
∑m
i=1Xi
?
= R, then
all MSi are verified by the AS;
Sends Pi and new Actcodei to all
MSi;
Each MSi verifies MAC2i
?
=
MAC2
′
i
(2) : Pi,MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKiC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Computes MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKi .
Computes P
′
i = DKi ⊕ IMSIi
and checks Pi
?
= P
′
i . If yes,
the AS is verified by all MSi.
Fig. 3: Proposed BAS-VAS protocol.
which is an improvement of the protocol previously published
in [45]. Let m be the total number of authentication requests
generated by the mobile users MSi (where i = 1, 2, 3,
. . . , m) and these requests are sent to the AS at the same
time or in a burst. The value of m actually depends upon
the capacity of the authentication server, which can then be
publicly announced or privately communicated to each mobile
subscriber as control information. The protocol comprises user
registration, pseudo-identity creation, protocol initialization
and protocol execution.
1. User Registration: Upon a user’s request, the operator
activates the SIM card by establishing a connection between
the SIM card and the AS. The AS generates a random one-
time code as Actcode, and stores Actcode in its database as
a label to the secret key SK, prior to sending Actcode to the
SIM card. The SIM card then receives and stores Actcode in
the memory, as shown in Figure 2. When an MS requests for
VAS, Actcode is sent from the MS to the AS. This allows the
AS to retrieve the requesting user’s SK key from the database
without actually knowing the original user identity, i.e., IMSI,
rather just by receiving the TID, as shown in Figure 3, the AS
side computations.
2. Pseudo-identity Creation: The generation of TID and
retrieval of IMSI are not publicly available. We also introduce
an encryption function to generate a temporary identity, where
each MSi generates a delegation key DKi = f1(Ti)SKi derived
from the shared secret key SKi. Here, Ti is the current
timestamp, and f1() a one-way hash-based MAC function (e.g.,
HMACSHA256 [47]). If the system is not synchronized or
the use of timestamp is not practical, we can use a nonce
(a random number) in place of timestamp value. Thereafter,
each MSi computes TIDi = f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi to avoid the
need to transmit the original IMSIi over the network, as
shown in Figure 3. This is designed to reduce the risk of ID-
theft, eavesdropping and MITM attacks. We remark that the
f2() function is just like any reversible symmetric encryption
function, such as AES with counter mode (AES-CTR). The
structure of this function may be known, but DKi remains
secret. This is another improvement over the protocol in [45],
as in the latter, f2() was used as a non-standard function.
3. Protocol Initialization: Initially, each MS chooses a
random number ki ∈ Z∗p, generates the current timestamp
Ti and a delegation key DKi, where Zp is a cyclic group
of integers modulo p. In fact, this DKi is generated at both,
the MSi and the AS using a shared secret key SKi stored
at the AS and on the SIM card at the time of manufacture.
Thereafter, each MSi computes Xi = ki ⊕ IMSIi and a token
value Si = (ki+DKi⊕G) mod m, where + is an addition and
⊕ is a bitwise-XOR operation. We refer to this token value a
symmetric-signature. Here, each mobile user generates a valid
symmetric-signature and fulfills the security properties with
Assumption 4, namely: authenticity (signer signs associated
message with its key), unforgeability (only signer can gen-
erate valid symmetric-signature for the associated message,
while assuming AS a trusted entity), non-reusability (generated
symmetric-signature cannot be used more than once), non-
repudiation (signer cannot deny signing a previous message,
i.e., symmetric-signature with an assumption of the AS as a
trusted entity), and integrity (ensures that contents have not
been modified). In a symmetric key protocol, both parties
(say, parties A and B) know the shared secret key. Hence,
it would be challenging for a third-party receiving a message
to determine whether the message was sent by party A or party
B. Therefore, in our context, only the two parties are involved
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and send messages to each other, since only both MSi and AS
know the corresponding secret key SKi and the generated DKi
key.
When a message is sent from the MSi to the AS with
a token value (symmetric-signature) Si, the AS knows that
the used DKi can only be generated by the corresponding
MSi (which can also be determined by verifying IMSIi from
the received TIDi). Therefore, it is clear to the AS that the
received message was actually sent by the corresponding MSi.
Similarly, this applies for the MSi receiving a message from
the AS. In addition, since the generated DKi is not transmitted
over the network, the adversary A is unable to compromise
DKi. One possible way is to provide non-forgeability and non-
repudiation using asymmetric key cryptography, where each
party sends an encrypted message signed using the sender’s
private key. On the other hand, the receiver verifies the digital
signature using the sender’s public key. Since BAS-VAS deals
with only symmetric key cryptography, signatures generated
by asymmetric keys are not performed. In the presented
scenario, the adversary A cannot generate valid symmetric-
signature, as it does not know the SKi key and is unable to
generate the DKi key. Moreover, the MSi and the AS are able
to determine the sender of the message. Therefore, the process
fulfills the required security properties.
4. Protocol Execution: Step 1: Each MSi sends an au-
thentication request, (Ti, Xi, Si,TIDi) and Actcodei, to the AS
along with MAC1i = f3(Ti, Xi, Si,TIDi,Actcodei), where
f3() is HMACSHA1 – a hash-based MAC function, and the
key used is DKi. On receiving the authentication requests, the
AS first computes MAC1
′
i and compares MAC1i
?
= MAC1
′
i. If
the verification is successful, then the AS retrieves SKi from
the respective Actcodei, and then computes DKi and IMSIi =
f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi . Next, the AS computes P =
∑m
i=1(DKi ⊕
IMSIi) and R =
∑m
i=1(Si⊕ IMSIi)−(G⊕P ), where G is the
identity of the service provider. If
∑m
i=1(Xi
?
= R) at the AS,
all MSi are successfully verified by the AS. Otherwise, this
implies one or more MSi are malicious, which then requires
a re-batch authentication.
Re-batch Authentication Process: In a re-batch authentica-
tion process, the AS first finds all invalid MSi with the help of
an algorithm in [45], [48]. Thereafter, the AS removes invalid
MSi from the batch and again computes P =
∑m−t
i=1 (DKi ⊕
IMSIi) and R =
∑m−t
i=1 (Si ⊕ IMSIi) − (G ⊕ P ), where t
is the total number of invalid MSi. The AS then compares∑m−t
i=1 (Xi
?
= R). If it holds, all MSi are authenticated by the
AS. Otherwise, it repeats the re-batch authentication process.
A batch of authentication requests can be divided at most
dlog2 me times. At the end, this algorithm has a set of
total number of invalid requests from MSi and these invalid
requests must be removed from the batch before a re-batch
authentication takes place. Each invalid MSi is placed in the
black list of MSi and can only be removed after a predefined
time. During this period the request from particular MSi is
discarded.
Step 2: The AS sends all Pi to the respective MSi
Algorithm 1 Invalid req algorithm (AR)
Input: The AS receives a batch (AR) of m authentication
requests {R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rm}
Output: Returns the invalid request(s) otherwise return true
if (verify(AR)) then return True
else
if (size(AR)==1) then return IMSIi  AR as invalid
request
else
set AR1 = {R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rdm/2e}
set AR2 = {Rdm/2e+1, Rdm/2e+2, Rdm/2e+3, . . . ,
Rm}
Invalid req algorithm (AR1)
Invalid req algorithm (AR2)
along with MAC2i and E(Actcodei)DKi , where MAC2i =
f3(Pi, E(Actcodei)DKi) and E(Actcodei)DKi is a randomly
generated activation code encrypted by DKi key. Each MSi
decrypts and uses Actcodei the next time it requests for VAS.
On receiving the messages from the AS, all MSi first compute
MAC2
′
i and compare MAC2i
?
= MAC2
′
i. If it holds, then all
MSi retrieve and store Actcodei, compute P
′
i and compare
Pi
?
= P
′
i , where P
′
i = (DKi ⊕ IMSIi). If the verification is
successful, all MSi verify the AS. Otherwise, the particular
MSi terminates the connection and initiates a fresh request to
the AS.
Subsequent Authentication Request: Any subsequent re-
quest initiated by respective MSi within the expiry time of
DKi is treated as a session request as shown in Figure 4 and
is handled as follows:
Some of the computations (DKi, Xi, Si) are stored at the
MSi as well as at the AS until the expiry time of DKi. Thus,
if an MSi requests for an authentication within the expiry
time, then (DKi, Xi, Si) do not change at the MSi. Instead,
only a new TIDi is generated by the new Ti and IMSIi. Each
MSi sends TIDi, Ti and Actcodei to the AS. Similarly, at the
AS, only IMSIi is extracted from the received TIDi and Ti,
after retrieving DKi using Actcodei. In such a scenario, DKi
remains the same within the session time. If the AS finds a
valid MSi session active, the AS sends E(Actcodei)DKi to the
respective MSi and asks the SPS to start delivering service to
the corresponding MSi.
Reliability of the protocol can be understood as follows [18],
[45], [48]. In this protocol, if all MSi are successfully veri-
fied then this protocol achieves its maximum reliability with
respect to its performance. In such a case, this batch authenti-
cation protocol provides maximum successful authentications
between the AS and MSi at one time and generates minimum
verification delay. Let NMS be the maximum number of
authentication requests generated at one point of time. Out
of these requests, few can be invalid authentication requests,
denoted as NIN . Since, NMS can be a very large number based
on the type of value added service, the AS may not authenticate
all the requests at one time due to its capacity. We assume
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MSi AS
Generate new
TIDi = f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi
(1) : Ti, TIDi, Actcodei,MAC1i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B Verifies MAC1i
?
= MAC1
′
i .
IMSIi = f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi ;
MSi are verified by the AS;
Verifies MAC2i
?
= MAC2
′
i
(2) : MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKiC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Sends E(Actcodei)DKi to MSi.
Fig. 4: Subsequent authentication request in BAS-VAS protocol.
that NAS is the maximum capacity of the AS to authenticate
the requests at one time. Let Prob{t} be the probability that
exactly t invalid authentication requests are sent to the AS.
Then, the probability of the Hypergeometric distribution is as
follows:
Prob{t} =
 NMS −NIN
NAS − t
 NIN
t

 NMS
NAS
 ; t = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
This indicates that (NAS - t) valid requests are sent from
(NMS - NIN ). One or more invalid request(s) in a batch
leads to batch verification failure and in such cases re-batch
verification is required.
Impact of Mobility When a User Moves Out of Range of
the AS: We also assume that various AS are installed and de-
ployed at different geographic locations and are interconnected
to each other with a pre-shared secret key between each pair
of the AS. The AS where the user is registered is referred to
as Home-AS, and all other AS deployed in roaming areas are
Visiting-AS. When a mobile user requests for VAS in a roaming
area, the corresponding Visiting-AS handles the request and
sends the request message encrypted with a pre-shared secret
key to the Home-AS of the user. The protocol execution takes
place at the Home-AS and the result is securely provided to
the Visiting-AS. Thereafter, the roaming Visiting-AS grants or
revokes VAS to the user.
Distributing Different VAS to Respective SPS in Priority
of User’s Need: The AS authenticates all requests in a batch,
irrespective of the type of service requested (ticket booking,
news alerts, etc.). After successful authentication of the mobile
users, the AS distributes the users’ VAS requests and their
encrypted priorities of the services to the respective SPS.
While this scenario is not a part of the authentication
protocol, it provides a new feature of sorting encrypted integer
priorities to ensure that the priority of the service requested by
each user is not revealed to either AS or SPS. In such a case, we
consider a public/secret keypair-based bilinear system for the
SPS. Each MSi encrypts a Priority Message (EPKSPS{PMi})
using a public key of the SPS and sends the encrypted message
to the AS. After authenticating all MSi, the AS aggregates all
requests grouped by different VAS and sends a list of TIDi and
encrypted messages (discussed later) to the respective SPS, as
shown in Figure 5. Upon receiving a list, each SPS performs
sorting over the encrypted PMi, arranges them in priority
order as per users’ need and notifies the AS that tells each
user (by mapping TIDi with IMSIi) about the waiting time
of the requested service to be served. Subsequently, each SPS
List of Authentication 
Requests
Authentication Server 
(AS)
Value Added Service 
Provider Server (SPS)
List of Authenticated 
Users Sorted by Priority
List of Authenticated 
Users Sorted by Priority
List of Authenticated 
Users Sorted by Priority
SPS1
SPS2
SPSn
Fig. 5: An example scenario of AS sending a list of authenti-
cated requests to each respective SPS.
provides its services to different users based on their order in
the sorted list.
We use a Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme for this
task, with an integer N = p × q, where p and q are large
primes [49]. Homomorphic encryption, denoted by [.], is used
to encrypt the data represented by integers. A plaintext and a
ciphertext are computed with modulo N and modulo N2. We
use additive homomorphic encryption for two integers x and
y, where [x].[y] = [x+ y] mod N2. The multiplicative inverse
of x modulo N2 is denoted by an integer y = x−1, where
0 ≤ y < N2 such that xy = 1 mod N2 and can also be used
to negate an encrypted integer: [x]← [x]−1 mod N2.
We use a homomorphic encryption scheme [50] to perform
additive operations in the following algorithms:
(a) Key generation: This algorithm generates the public
keys and global parameters, given a security parameter.
Let us consider two primes p and q, and N = p × q.
Choose a generator of the group g ∈ Z∗N2 . Let
λ(N) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), where lcm represents least
common multiple, and the public and secret keys of the
receiver are PK = (N, g) and SK = (λ(N)), respectively.
(b) Encryption: The sender chooses message M ∈ ZN
and a random number r ∈ Z∗N2 . Thereafter, the sender
computes the ciphertext using:
C = E(M) = gMrN mod N2,
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where rN is used to generate different ciphertexts, even
when the same message is encrypted twice.
(c) Decryption: In order to decrypt message C, the receiver
computes:
M = D(C) =
L(Cλ(N) mod N2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N,
where the function L takes an input from a set {u <
N2|u = 1 mod N} and computes L(u) = (u−1)/N . In
additive homomorphism, the sender computes two cipher-
texts C1 = E(M1) and C2 = E(M2) from M1, M2 ∈
ZN , and the receiver decrypts D{(C1.C2 mod N2) =
E(M1 + M2) mod N} that generates a sum of the
plaintexts.
We now discuss the comparison and sorting of two en-
crypted PM, say [PM1] and [PM2]. Both PM have an upper
bound d and the priority messages are PM1/d and PM2/d.
The output is a bit, say t as t = 1 when PM1 ≤ PM2
and zero otherwise. The relation with encrypted division as
(PM1 ≤ PM2) = (d+ PM2 − PM1)/d.
If PM1 ≤ PM2, then x = d + PM2 − PM1 ≥ d and t = 1;
otherwise, x < d and t = 0.
The steps of this process repeated for each pair of encrypted
priority messages are as follows:
1) Upon receiving the encrypted priority messages from
different MSi, the AS chooses a random number r of
log2 N−1 bits, encrypts r using PK key of the SPS, and
computes [x]← [d+ PM2 − PM1] = [d].[PM2].[PM1]−1
and [z] ← [x + r] = [x].[r]. Then, the AS sends [r] and
[z] to the SPS.
2) The SPS decrypts [r] and [z] using its secret key (PRSPS),
and computes r mod d and z mod d.
3) The SPS compares the inputs of PM1 (i.e., r mod d) and
PM2 (i.e., z mod d) and observes the output. The output
bit t = 1 for PM1 iff {z mod d < r mod d}, and 0
otherwise.
We repeat the process for all unordered pairs of encrypted
priority messages using Timsort [51]. This sorting algorithm
takes advantages of partial orderings that exist in most real-
world data. Baldimtsi et al. used Batcher sort, which sorts a set
of n-elements using O(n (log n)2) data independent calls to a
comparator function (i.e., number of rounds is the same for a
fixed n), where O((log n)2) are consecutive levels and O(n)
are pairs of elements compared and swapped at each level [52].
On the other hand, Timsort has O(n) best case complexity, and
O(n log n) average and worst case performance.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides the security analysis of BAS-VAS
based on various security aspects, such as prevention against
security attacks, attempts to retrieve secret and delegation keys
over the network, at the AS and at the MS, attempts to capture
IMSI of the users, forward/backward secrecy, indistinguisha-
bility, and fairness and correctness of the protocol.
Property 1. The proposed protocol defeats MITM, replay,
redirection, flood-based DoS and impersonation attacks be-
tween the MSi and the AS. Furthermore, the adversary A is
not able to compromise the security of the message by delaying
the message.
BAS-VAS provides mutual authentication between the AS
and the MSi. Specifically, the AS authenticates the MSi by
checking (
∑m
i=1Xi)
?
= R, and each MSi authenticates the AS
by comparing Pi
?
= P
′
i . Each MSi receives Pi = DKi⊕ IMSIi
from the AS and computes its P
′
i = DKi ⊕ IMSIi. If any of
the MSi or AS does not verify successfully, then the respective
user terminates the connection. This process prevents our
system against redirection and impersonation attacks, and
also resolves flood-based DoS attack by performing re-batch
verification. Furthermore, f2() is implemented as AES-CTR
that hides the user’s identity and encrypts the activation code
each time the user requests for another VAS. Therefore, it
helps to protect the system against MITM attacks, as A cannot
capture IMSI using IMSI catcher. Furthermore, the timestamp
(or nonce) values sent along with each message protect the
system against replay attacks. Moreover, integrity protection
of each transmitted message (message content and its thresh-
old delivery in time, Treceive ≤ Tgenerate + Tthreshold) is
maintained using MAC that prevents message tampering.
Property 2. Adversary A is unable to extract SKi and DKi
keys over the network, at the MSi, and at the AS. A will not
not be able to successfully retrieve the SKi or DKi key, even
if it captures Actcodei of a mobile user sent over the network.
A unique DKi key is used within a session for each
authentication between the AS and each MSi. Each DKi is
generated from a SKi key and is stored at the AuC and on the
SIM card at the time of manufacture. Since a random Actcodei
is sent over the network each time the MSi requests for a VAS,
the protocol is secure even if A is able to capture Actcodei.
Note that A cannot retrieve the SKi and DKi keys, as they are
never sent over the network. Moreover, if A retrieves some
Actcodei, it cannot derive any relation among them, as these
Actcodei are randomly generated. Moreover, each Actcodei is
sent exactly once in plaintext over the network from the MSi
to the AS. The AS always generates a random Actcodei and
sends to each MSi as a ciphertext. Furthermore, if A modifies
the encrypted Actcodei in message-2 from the AS, computed
MAC2
′
i will not match with the received MAC2i at the MSi.
Also, the message will not decrypt correctly using a modified
or fabricated DKi of the MSi. Hence, the MSi terminates the
connection.
Property 3. Adversary A cannot trace the original identity
of the MSi. In fact, A will also be unsuccessful in identifying
the actual user, even if it captures the TIDi of a mobile user.
Definition 1: (Untraceability): Our protocol satisfies un-
traceability, as A cannot distinguish whether two TID cor-
respond to the same MS or two different MS.
Verify(publicChannel)[(IMSI1, IMSI2)|TIDi|MS|AS] ≈
Verify(publicChannel)[IMSI1|IMSI2|TIDi|MS|AS].
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Definition 2: (IND-ANO: Indistinguishability under Anony-
mous Identity): Our protocol is IND-ANO, as no adversary A
at time t can distinguish between two chosen identities TID1
and TID2 with a negligible  advantage.
Pr[A(TID1) = 1]− Pr[A(TID2) = 1] ≤ .
In our protocol, privacy of each MSi is well protected.
The TIDi is computed from original IMSIi as TIDi =
f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi . We implement f2() as AES-CTR with DKi
key, which is secure as no practical full attack has been found
on AES at the time of this research. Furthermore, for all VAS
requests including subsequent requests, a different TIDi is
generated each time when a user connects to the AS. The
AS flushes out TIDi from its memory, once a protocol run is
completed. Hence, untraceability and identity anonymity are
maintained, as A cannot trace TIDi to link with users and also
IMSIi cannot be revealed to A and intermediate operators.
Property 4. Adversary A cannot link current session in-
formation with the previous sessions. Moreover, our protocol
maintains perfect forward/backward secrecy and chosen plain-
text attack indistinguishability (IND-CPA) [53].
For each fresh VAS request, the MSi and the AS generate
a fresh DKi key with a unique timestamp, temporary identity
of the user, Actcodei and ki. Therefore, A cannot retrieve any
information based on linkability among various VAS requests.
Definition 3: Our protocol maintains backward and forward
secrecy, as no A could discover previously used session keys
or generate future keys. A only wins if its output bit b′ is equal
to the random bit b in query and has a negligible advantage.
The SKi and DKi keys are never sent over the network. The
DKi is used to encrypt IMSIi and Actcodei using AES-CTR.
Even compromising current DKi will not allow A to generate
past or future keys. Also, the past keys cannot be used for
future sessions as both ends generate a new DKi key.
Definition 4: (IND-CPA: Indistinguishability under Chosen
Plaintext Attack): Our protocol is IND-CPA secure, as no
adversary A in time t can distinguish between two chosen
messages msg1 and msg2, and has no or negligible advantage.
Pr
DKi←SKi
[A(msg1) = 1]− Pr
DKi←SKi
[A(msg2) = 1] ≤ .
We assume that A has unlimited access to the encrypted
data using a random oracle. In our protocol, the messages
encrypted by the same key generate different ciphertext as at
least one of the input parameters is always different. The MSi
generates TIDi as f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi , where Ti changes each
fresh message. Furthermore, the AS generates a fresh Actcodei
for each new session and passes Actcodei to the respective MSi
as E(Actcodei)DKi . Note, each fresh Actcodei is encrypted and
sent over the network only once. We use AES-CTR as f2()
that encrypts successive values of a counter with AES, and
regurgitates concatenation of the encrypted blocks. AES-CTR
stream never includes twice the same block and is IND-CPA.
Property 5. The proposed protocol works well under both
passive and active corruption attacks in the presence of static
and adaptive adversaries A. The protocol achieves fairness
and guaranteed output delivery with “no MSi (malicious or
legitimate) having an advantage”. The protocol maintains
correctness under honest, semi-honest and no-honest majority
scenarios.
Passive corruption attack means that A obtains the com-
plete information held by the corrupted MSi; however, the
MSi still runs the protocol correctly. On the other hand,
active corruption attack refers that A takes full control of
corrupted MSi. In both cases, our protocol works correctly, as
it maintains IND-CPA indistinguishability as well as perfect
forward/backward secrecy. Moreover, keys are never sent over
the network and new delegation keys are generated for each
session. Furthermore, both passive and active adversaries may
be static (a set of corrupted MSi is chosen before the protocol
starts), or adaptive (A can choose any corrupted MSi at any
time during the run of the protocol). In any case, A’s selection
of corrupted MSi does not affect our protocol.
A protocol is said to be fair if it ensures that no user can gain
a significant advantage over other users, even if the protocol
halts for any reason. Consider a scenario in which MS1 and
MS2 communicate with the AS at the same time. If all the MS1,
MS2 and AS are trusted, then the MS1/MS2 and the AS can
learn each others information. However, the MS1 cannot learn
anything about MS2’s information and vice versa, as one user
cannot obtain any other user’s DKi key. Also, the user cannot
derive IMSIi and signature Si of any other user, as DKi is
secret and ki is randomly generated by the MSi. Our protocol
maintains IND-CPA; therefore, no MSi has an advantage over
others.
Our protocol works correctly under all three scenarios. We
consider these scenarios at the MSi only, whereas the AS is
considered as a trusted server similar to the server in the
traditional cellular network. This is because the AS keeps
SKi of all MSi secret; therefore, it cannot be dishonest or
semi-dishonest. The effectiveness of our protocol under all
three scenarios can be observed using re-batch verification
delay. Under these scenarios, our protocol maintains security
properties, such as IND-CPA, forward/backward secrecy and
fairness.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
protocol, in terms of transmission and computation overheads,
execution time, and batch and re-batch verification times.
A. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is defined as the total number
of bits transmitted during the authentication over the network.
Although in the literature we did not find any protocol that
is directly related to our work (designed for batch verification
and delivering of VAS), we compare the communication over-
head of BAS-VAS with those of ABAKA [18], SPECS [21], b-
SPECS+ [22], IBV [19] and RAISE [20]. This is because these
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protocols support mutual authentications while keeping the
same flow of information. However, the verification delays dif-
fer between VANET protocols and mobile network protocols,
such as BAS-VAS, because VANET networks have additional
devices and road side equipment used to communicate within
the network. We also discuss the transmission overhead during
the single and batch authentication requests.
Single Authentication: In Table II, m = 1 in batch au-
thentication denotes a single authentication process, and m is
the maximum number of authentication requests generated by
different mobile users at any one time. In BAS-VAS, the device
is a mobile user and the server is an authentication server. It
can be clearly observed that compared with ABAKA [18] and
RAISE [19], BAS-VAS has a lower transmission overhead (i.e.,
72 and 32 bytes from the MSi to the AS and the AS to the
MSi, respectively). However, this overhead is slightly larger,
in comparison to IBV [19]. However, IBV does not transmit
data from the server to the device. Moreover, BAS-VAS is
more efficient than both SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22], as it
generates only 114 bytes of communication overhead, whereas
SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22] generate 176 and 288 bytes,
respectively.
Batch Authentication: Multiple requests (m = 2, 3, . . . , i)
can be handled simultaneously by a batch verification process.
We compare our protocol with other discussed protocols for a
single (m = 1) as well as batch (m = 50, 100, 200, 500 and
1,000) authentications. In batch/single authentications from
the device to the server, BAS-VAS achieves a 14.29% and
10% reduction in transmission bandwidth, in comparison to
the ABAKA and RAISE protocols, respectively. Similarly, from
the server to the device batch/single authentications, BAS-VAS
reduces the bandwidth consumption by 60%, in comparison
to the ABAKA and RAISE protocols, respectively. Moreover,
SPECS and b-SPECS+ use additional 35.23% and 60.42% of
the bandwidth consumption as compared to BAS-VAS.
To show the practicability of the proposed protocol, we have
compared the generated communication overhead of BAS-VAS
with the EasySMS protocol [16] that supports only one-to-
one (single) authentication. For m number of mobile users,
the EasySMS generates 1896 + 256 × m, whereas the BAS-
VAS creates 104 × m. When m = 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, the
BAS-VAS outperforms EasySMS by 95.16% (2152-104/2152),
TABLE II: Communication Overhead in Batch Authentication:
Comparative Summary
Protocol Device
to Server
(bytes)
Intermediate
Authority
(bytes)
Server to De-
vice (bytes)
ABAKA [18] 84m – 80m
SPECS [21] 48m 96m 32m
b-SPECS+ [22] 48m 176m 64m
IBV [19] 63m – N/A
RAISE [20] 80m – 80m
BAS-VAS 72m – 32m
76.66% (4456-1040/4456), 62.17% (27496-10400/27496), and
59.67% (257896-104000/257896), respectively.
B. Computation Overhead
This section analyzes the computation overhead of BAS-VAS
during a single as well as batch authentications.
Single MSi Authentication with Active Session: The com-
puted overheads at the MSi and the AS are as follows:
At MSi: f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi , f1(Ti)SKi , ki⊕IMSIi, Y = G⊕DKi,
ki + Y , DKi ⊕ IMSIi, MAC1i, MAC2
′
i, D(Actcodei)DKi .
At AS: f1(Ti)SKi , f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi , DKi ⊕ IMSIi, S
′
i = Si ⊕
IMSIi, G
′
= G⊕P , S′−G′ , MAC1′i, MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKi .
Batch MSi Authentication with Active Session (i = 2, . . . ,
m): The computed overheads at the MSi and the AS are as
follows:
At MSi: m[f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi ], m[f1(Ti)SKi ], m[ki ⊕ IMSIi],
m[Y = G ⊕ DKi], m[ki + Y ], m[DKi ⊕ IMSIi], m[MAC1i],
m[MAC2
′
i], m[D(Actcodei)DKi ].
At AS: m[f1(Ti)SKi ], m[f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi ], m[DKi ⊕ IMSIi],
(m − 1)[P = ∑mi=1 Pi], m[S′i = Si ⊕ IMSIi], G′ = G ⊕ P ,
(m − 1)[S′ = ∑mi=1 S′i ], m[S′ − G′ ], (m − 1)[∑mi=1Xi],
m[MAC1
′
i], m[MAC2i], m[E(Actcodei)DKi ].
The total computation overhead for a single authentication
includes 4 Enc/Dec functions, 2 key generation functions, 6
XOR, 4 MACs, 1 Addition and 1 Subtraction operations. Simi-
larly, the total computation overhead for a batch authentication
includes 4m Enc/Dec functions, 2m key generation functions,
(5m+1) XOR, 4m MACs, (4m-3) Addition and m Subtraction
operations. One can observe that in the proposed protocol
as well as the EasySMS protocol, the computation overhead
is theoretically the same, i.e., 18 bytes, when m (single
authentication) = 1. The communication overhead generated
by the proposed protocol is 104 bytes for single authentication,
whereas the EasySMS protocol generates 2152 bytes. Clearly,
the BAS-VAS protocol is more communication efficient than
EasySMS.
VI. SIMULATION FINDINGS
This section presents the simulation results of BAS-VAS
in Java. We compute and evaluate the total execution time
(Section VI.1), the batch verification time (Section VI.2) and
the re-batch verification time (Section VI.3) of our protocol.
We also present the time, space and cost complexity analysis
of BAS-VAS.
A. Protocol Execution Time
This section describes the total execution time of the BAS-
VAS protocol. We consider a client-server paradigm for the
MSi and the AS, the simulations are conducted on an Intel
Core i3-2330M 2.20GHz machine with Windows7 and 256
MB RAM using J2ME with mobile emulator and JDK1.7.
We simulate our protocol with 50 MS and a single AS. We
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consider the average value of 30 iterations for each result. On
average, the execution time to perform addition (Tadd), XOR
(Txor) and subtraction (Tsub) are 0.000933 milliseconds (ms),
0.030322 ms and 0.000933 ms, respectively. On average, the
server connection establishment time is 3383 ms, transmis-
sion time for message (Ti, Xi, Si,TIDi,MAC1i,Actcodei) and
message (Pi,MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKi ) are 8.35 ms and 9.49
ms, respectively. Table III and Table IV present the findings
of computed parameters, where Ext, MUP, and Enc and Dec
are execution time (ms), memory used by the program (bytes),
and encryption and decryption operations (ms).
Furthermore, we implement f2() as AES-CTR with 128 bits
DKi key passing input as IMSIi/TIDi and Ti and receiving
output of 128 bits [54]. We also implement AES-CTR for
Actcodei encryption with input of 64 bits as Actcodei concate-
nated with 64 bits FFFFFFFF. Table III presents the findings
obtained for f2() and Actcode. The encryption (generation
of TIDi) took 13.6 ms and decryption (generation of IMSIi)
executed 4.2 ms for f2(), while it took 12.8 ms and 4.1 ms,
respectively, for the encryption and decryption of Actcodei.
The f1() and f3() are implemented as HMACSHA256 and
HMACSHA1, respectively. Table IV presents the findings,
where the output of HMACSHA1 and HMACSHA256 are
truncated to 64 and 128 bits as MAC and DKi, respectively.
The input to HMACSHA1 and HMACSHA256 are 512 bits.
The total execution time in a single authentication = server
connection establishment time + transmission time for all
messages + computation time at MSi and AS = 4519.62 ms.
The total execution time in a batch authentication =
0.028456+4519.59×m ms.
The single authentication process takes 4.5 s, and takes 45
s, 451 s, and 4519 s, respectively, when 10, 100, and 1,000
mobile users are involved in the process. Overall, on average
4.5 s computation time will be required by each mobile
user, which is reasonably good as the mobile phones can
easily tolerate and perform this computation and handle the
execution time. Hence, this overhead does not have any advert
performance impact on real mobile phones and applications.
B. Verification Time
This section presents the verification time in the sin-
gle and batch authentication requests. Here, verification
time for an MSi is the time between the sent mes-
sage (Ti, Xi, Si,TIDi,MAC1i,Actcodei) and received re-
sponse message (Pi,MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKi ). The verifica-
tion time computed by the AS is the time between the
sent messages (Pi,MAC2i, E(Actcodei)DKi ) and the protocol
completion.
Verification time in a batch authentication:
For MSi: 172×m+13.6×m+185×m+185×m+0.030322×
(2m+1)+0.000933+0.000933×(3m-3)+12.8×m = 0.028456+
568.46×m ms.
For AS: 185×m+0.030322×m+4.1×m = 189.13×m ms.
Verification time in a single authentication:
Consider m = 1 in the above verification time.
TABLE III: Computations of f2() and Actcode
Function ExT Enc (ms) ExT Dec (ms)
f2() = AES-CTR 13.6 4.2
Actcode = AES-CTR 12.8 4.1
TABLE IV: Computations of f3() and f1() functions
Function ExT (ms) MUP (bytes)
f3() = HMACSHA1 172 1718448
f1() = HMACSHA256 185 1718568
C. Re-batch Verification Time
If a batch authentication is not successful, then it is expected
to execute a re-batch authentication without including the
invalid MSi. After detecting the invalid MSi, we remove them
from the batch and execute a re-batch authentication.
Total verification time in a re-batch authentication =
0.031255+ 0.002799×(m−t) ms = 0.000031+0.000002×(m−
t) sec. This time is sufficiently small to be considered negli-
gible.
Figure 6 depicts BAS-VAS’s execution time, verification time
for the MSi and verification time for the AS, when (a) the
MSi authentication requests m = 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and
(b) m = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1,000. On average, for each
MS, the protocol execution time, verification delay at the
MS and verification delay at the AS are 4.5, 0.56 and 0.18
sec., respectively. Furthermore, Figure 7 represents a re-batch
verification time, when m = 5, 10, 20, 30, 50; t = 1, 2, 4, 9,
25, and (b) m = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1,000; t = 1, 10, 20, 49,
99, 499. Note that the protocol execution time is the time in
completing mutual authentication between all the MSi and the
AS, depending upon the number of authentication requests. For
m = 50, the re-batch verification times are 0.17 ms and 0.10
ms, respectively, when t = 1 and t = 25 under honest majority
and semi-honest majority scenarios. Similarly, for m = 1,000,
the times are 2.8 ms and 1.4 ms, respectively, when t = 1
and t = 499 under honest majority and semi-honest majority.
Under no-honest majority scenario, re-batch verification times
are 0.079 and 0.033 ms, when m = 50 and t = 26 and 49,
respectively. Similarly, for m = 1,000, the times are 1.029 and
0.033 ms, when t = 501 and 999, respectively.
In the scenario of an IoT environment where m = 100,000,
the total execution time of all MS in a batch authentication
is 451959000.02 ms. In other words, on average 4.519 s
execution time will be required by each mobile user. Similarly,
total verification times for MS and AS will be 0.568 s and 0.189
s (in total, 0.75 s), respectively, when m = 100,000. Total re-
batch verification times when m = 100,000 will be 0.20 s (t
=1), 0.199 s (t = 499), 0.199 s (t = 501), 0.198 s (t = 999),
and 0.000033 s (t = 99999). Note that even m = 100,000,
there is no observed adverse impact on the performance of
the proposed protocol. In fact, the computed results remain
consistent (changes were observed only in the decimal values).
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Fig. 6: Execution time of BAS-VAS and verification delay for each MS and the AS, considering m authentication requests.
Number of authentication requests by multiple MS
0 10 20 30 40 50
Ti
m
e 
(m
illis
ec
on
ds
)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
t = 1
t = 2
t = 4
t = 9
t = 25
(a) m = 5, 10, 20, 30, 50; t = 1, 2, 4, 9, 25.
Number of authentication requests by multiple MS
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Ti
m
e 
(m
illis
ec
on
ds
)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t = 1
t = 10
t = 20
t = 49
t = 99
t = 499
(b) m = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1,000; t = 1, 10, 20, 49, 99, 499.
Fig. 7: Re-batch verification time of BAS-VAS, considering t out of m authentication requests are malicious requests.
Thus, increasing the number of mobile users will not increase
the protocol overhead and execution time. Hence, BAS-VAS
supports scalability and efficiency, with adequate security.
D. Time, Space and Cost Complexity Analysis
In a single and batch authentication processes, we imple-
ment two functions f1() and f3() as HMAC functions, and
Actcode and f2() as AES-CTR. The outputs of HMACSHA1
and HMACSHA256 are 160 bits and 256 bits, respectively.
The DKi key needs 128 bits from 160 bits and MAC requires
64 bits out of 256 bits. In total, 192 bits are stored. The time
complexity for addition, subtraction and XOR operations are
constant (i.e., O(1)). For a single authentication (8 operations)
and a batch authentication (9×m − 1 operations), their cost
are O(1). The block cipher algorithm (e.g., AES) works with
a fixed input size and has O(1) constant complexity. However,
when the algorithm has a variable length input (say |m|), the
time is O(m). For f2() and Actcode encryption in our protocol,
the block size is fixed (128 bits) in AES-CTR (with random
Initialization Vector (IV)). Therefore, the time complexity
is independent of input and is constant O(1). Hence, in a
single authentication (2 operations) and a batch authentication
(2×m operations), the costs are O(1) for f2() and Actcode
encryption/ decryption. The 128 bits of IMSIi and TIDi also
need to be stored. Furthermore, storage for HMACSHA1,
HMACSHA256, and AES-CTR at the MSi and the AS are
required. For a re-batch verification, O(1) is only the extra cost
need to be paid (for 3m-3t+2 operations). Therefore, BAS-VAS
is an efficient, secure and cost effective protocol that requires
less storage.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The increasingly popularity of mobile devices and deliv-
ering VAS over mobile devices is a trend that is unlikely
to go away any time soon. In this paper, we proposed a
batch-oriented authentication and key agreement protocol that
provides mutual authentication between each mobile user and
the authentication server. The mutual authentication ensures
the secure delivery of VAS to a legitimate requesting mobile
user. Specifically, it efficiently verifies multiple requests sent
by different MS at any one time while ensuring the original
IMSI is kept private during the authentication as well as
ensuring on-time delivery of VAS. Our protocol is also more
efficient than the protocol in [44] in terms of preserving user
privacy over the network. To the best of our knowledge, BAS-
VAS is the first batch-oriented authentication protocol that
provides VAS to mobile users. The protocol is designed on
symmetric key cryptography, with the exception of our Paillier
homomorphic encryption-based scheme. The latter scheme
sorts encrypted integer data to maintain the privacy of the
priorities of the requested services.
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In both batch/single authentications from the device to the
server, BAS-VAS achieves a significant reduction in transmis-
sion bandwidth by 14.29% and 10% respectively, in compar-
ison to the ABAKA and RAISE protocols. From the server to
the device in both batch/single authentications, the proposed
protocol requires a lower (60%) communication bandwidth
than the ABAKA and RAISE protocols. Moreover, our protocol
is more efficient than SPECS and b-SPECS+ by 35.23% and
60.42%, respectively. Findings from our Java simulations of
the protocol indicated that the estimated re-batch verification
time to be almost negligible, and in the worst case scenario,
the re-batch verification time is 2.8 ms when one out of
1,000 requests is invalid (i.e., 999 requests will need to be
executed in a re-batch). The findings (i.e., execution and
verification times) also suggest the potential for our protocol
to be deployed in a real-world mobile network.
Frequent mobility of users in their visiting networks is out
of the scope of this work. However, in case (i) when the users
belong to different geographical regions, their authentication
will be achieved using the process discussed in the EasySMS
protocol [16], and (ii) when the user moves to a visiting
network, the authentication is completed by the process men-
tioned in SAKA [36], ES-AKA [39], and IoT-enabled LTE
AKA [55], respectively, in 2G, 3G, and 4G networks. The
additional communication overhead in BAS-VAS will include
routing transmitted information from the Visiting-AS to the
Home-AS. The future direction of this work will include a
lightweight implementation of a Homomorphic encryption and
further reduction of overall computation and execution time.
APPENDIX A
FORMAL PROOF
This section presents the formal proof of the proposed
protocol using Proverif, an automatic verification tool [56]. We
perform five adversary queries: (i) Can an adversary success-
fully recover confidential information from the messages sent
over the network?, (ii) Can an adversary successfully compute
parameters generated by the MS?, (iii) Can an adversary
successfully compute parameters generated by the AS?, (iv)
Can an adversary successfully generate DK key of the MS?,
and (v) Can an adversary successfully recover secret key of the
MS? The following queries (under settings mentioned below)
were made from an attacker point of view to verify whether
the proposed protocol is secure:
(* The key table consists of pairs (ident , key) shared between
the MS and the HN. Table is not accessible by the attacker *)
table keys ( ident , key ) .
table keys2 ( ident , sessKey ) .
free s : bitstring [ private ] .
(* Secrecy Property *)
query attacker ( s ) .
(* The standard secrecy queries of ProVerif only *)
(* deal with the secrecy of private free names *)
(* DK is secret if and only if all DK are secret *)
free DK : sessKey [ private ] .
query attacker ( DK ) .
not attacker (new kims ) .
(* Authentication queries *)
event begAS( ident, sessKey ) .
event endAS( ident, sessKey ) .
event begMS( ident, sessKey ) .
event endMS( ident, sessKey ) .
query x1 : ident, x2 : sessKey ;
event (endAS( x1, x2 ) ) ==> event (begAS( x1, x2 ) ) .
query x1 : ident, x2 : sessKey ;
event (endMS( x1, x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1, x2 ) ) .
event enableEnc .
(* When the attacker knows s, the event enableEnc has
been executed. *)
query attacker ( s ) ==> event ( enableEnc ) .
Run: The output from Proverif is as follows:
Neetesh@Neetesh-PC /proverif1.88
$ ./proverif examples/gsm/BAS-VAS.pv
Process: ( {1}!
(* Defining new values for MS. *){2}new imsims:ident;
{3}new kims:key;
{4}new tims:nonce;
{5}new actcodei:bitstring;
{6}new ki:bitstring;
{7}new G:bitstring;
{8}new m_36:bitstring;
{9}insert keys(imsims,kims);
{10}let DKms:sessKey = f1(tims,kims) in
{11}insert keys2(imsims,DKms);
(* Defining new functions with return
value for MS. *){12}let actcodei:bitstring = f5(rand) in
{13}let Xi:bitstring = f7(ki,imsims) in
{14}let Si:bitstring = f8(ki,DKms,G) in
{15}let Pi:bitstring = f9(DKms,imsims) in
{16}let tidms:ident = f2(imsims,tims,DKms)
in{17}let mac1ims:mac = f3(tims,Xi,Si,tidms,
actcodei) in{18}let mac2ims:mac = f4(Pi) in
{19}out(pubChannel,(MSG1,tims,Xi,Si,tidms,
mac1ims, actcodei));{20}event begAS(imsims,DKms);
{21}in(pubChannel,(=MSG2,Pias:bitstring,
mac2ias:mac, sencrypt(actcodei,DKms)));
{22}if (mac2ims = mac2ias) then
{23}event endAS(imsims,DKms);
{24}in(pubChannel,(=CMC,enableEncms:bool));
{25}event endMS(imsims,DKms);
{26}in(pubChannel,(=MSG,msg:bitstring));
{27}out(pubChannel,sencrypt(msg,DKms));
{28}if (enableEncms = true) then
{29}let msgcontent:bitstring =
sdecrypt(msg,DKms) in 0 ) | (
(* Defining new values for AS. *){30}new kias:key;
{31}new DKas:sessKey;
{32}new ki2:bitstring;
{33}new Gas:bitstring;
{34}new mas:bitstring;
{35}in(pubChannel,(=MSG1,tims2:nonce,
Xi_38:bitstring,Si_39:bitstring,tidas:
ident,mac1ims2:mac,actcodei2: bitstring));
{36}let imsias:ident =
f2(tidas,tims2,DKas) in{37}insert keys(imsias,kias);
{38}let DKas2:sessKey = f1(tims2,kias) in
{39}insert keys2(imsias,DKas2);
(* Defining new functions with return
value for AS. *){40}let actcodej2:bitstring = sdecrypt
(sencrypt(actcodei,DKms),DKms) in
{41}let Xias:bitstring = f7(ki2,imsias) in
{42}let Sias:bitstring = f8(ki2,DKas2,Gas)
in
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{43}let Pias2:bitstring = f9(DKas2,imsias)
in{44}let mac1ias:mac = f3(tims2,Xias,Sias,
tidas, actcodei2) in{45}let mac2ias2:mac = f4(Pias2) in
{46}new msg_46:bitstring;
{47}if (mac1ims2 = mac1ias) then
{48}event endAS(imsias,DKas2);
{49}out(pubChannel,(MSG2,Pias2,mac2ias2));
{50}new enableEncas:bool;
{51}event begMS(imsias,DKas2);
{52}out(pubChannel,(CMC,enableEncas));
{53}out(pubChannel,sencrypt(msg_46,DKas2
));{54}if (enableEncas = false) then
{55}event enableEnc;
{56}out(pubChannel,(MSG,s)) Else
{57}out(pubChannel,(MSG,sencrypt(s,
DKas2))))
Query attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc)
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption
verified: fact unreachable attacker
(kims[!1 = v_945])
RESULT attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc)
is true.
Query event(endMS(x1,x2)) ==>
event(begMS(x1,x2))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption
verified: fact unreachable attacker
(kims[!1 = v_2079])
RESULT event(endMS(x1,x2)) ==>
event(begMS(x1,x2)) is true.
Query event(endAS(x1_2400,x2_2401)) ==>
event(begAS(x1_2400,x2_2401))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption
verified: fact unreachable attacker
(kims[!1 = v_3256])
RESULT event(endAS(x1_2400,x2_2401)) ==>
event(begAS(x1_2400,x2_2401)) is true.
Query not attacker(DK[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption
verified: fact unreachable attacker
(kims[!1 = v_4331])
RESULT not attacker(DK[]) is true.
Query not attacker(s[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption
verified: fact unreachable attacker
(kims[!1 = v_5377])
RESULT not attacker(s[]) is true.
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